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Abstract
Even as a case can be made out for public spending on elementary
education, its link with enrolment rates does not appear strong.
However, once efficiency and demand-side factors are accounted for,
public spending is seen to make an impact on the rate of enrolment and
quality of education as measured by teacher-pupil ratio. Teacher-pupil
ratio and the number of schools, in turn, are seen to have a stronger
impact on the rate of enrolment in efficient states. Literacy rates as well
as state domestic product were seen to have a positive influence on
education. The share of public expenditure on elementary education in
GDP peaked in 1990-91 but never achieved the targeted level of 6 per
cent of GDP. The reforms brought a break in the growth rate of public
expenditure on elementary education, from which not all the states could
recover even over an extended period of time.1
I.  Introduction
Adjustment experiences in several parts of the world have raised
concerns that social sector expenditures are vulnerable to cuts during
periods of financial constraint. We consider an important sub-sector of
the social sector, namely, elementary education, to look at the question
of the impact of adjustment on public expenditure and hence on
outcome. There are three principal questions in this regard, which in our
view are crucially interlinked. First, is there a case for public spending
on elementary education? Second, does public spending make an impact
on the quality of education and educational outcome, particularly
enrolment? Third, what has been the impact of adjustment on public
spending on elementary education? The third question gains relevance
only if the answer to the first two is in the affirmative.
A rich literature has come up to answer the first question, and the
answer seems to be an undisputed yes. There are three principal
arguments in support of public spending on education. The first is based
on the link between education and economic growth. Crucial factors
include the high rates of return to education and large externalities
associated with it. The second is the recognition of the public good
character of education. The third is the particular historical context of
the developing countries. These are discussed in Section II.
The second question gains relevance because of the controversy in the
literature as to which aspects of school quality influenced by
government policy and expenditure are relevant for determining
educational outcomes. Hanushek has reviewed the existing research on
schooling to argue that school inputs (such as teacher-pupil ratio,
expenditure per pupil, teacher’s experience) do not determine schooling
outcomes either in developed countries (1986) or in developing
countries (1995). While it is admitted that schools do differ in quality,
i.e. in their ability to improve student differences ( Harbison and
Hanushek 1992), these differences are not seen to be highly correlated
with measured characteristics of teachers and schools. Moreover, as
Kremer (1995) in his comment on Hanushek (1995) notes, most studies2
were designed to give a small probability of falsely detecting a
significant effect of educational inputs so that chances of obtaining an
insignificant effect are large even if the true correlation is positive. Thus,
with reference to 12 studies on expenditure per pupil quoted by
Hanushek, Kremer notes that assuming a 5 per cent chance of each study
yielding a significantly positive result if the true coefficient was zero,
the chances of six or more studies out of twelve being significantly
positive would be only one in a million. Dearden, Ferri, and  Meghir
(2002) found that after controlling for ability and family background,
pupil-teacher ratio (a measure often used for education quality) does not
affect educational qualifications or men’s wages though it has an impact
on women’s wages at the age of 33. Feinstein and James (1999) find that
parenting is more important than pupil-teacher ratio for educational
attainments. On the other hand, Singh and Santiago (1997) find evidence
from Mexico that policy variables, government expenditure, and pupil-
teacher ratio are strong determinants of chidren’s attainment of primary
schooling. Similarly, controlling for household background variables,
Case and Deaton (1999) find strong and significant effects of pupil-
teacher ratios on enrolment, educational achievement, and on test scores
for numeracy. In the Indian case, Sipahimalani (1999), and Dreze and
Kingdon (1999) report that school quality matters a lot in explaining
school participation even after controlling for household characteristics.
Sipahimalani presents evidence in favour of school quality affecting
school participation.  Dreze and  Kingdon’s study shows that child-
teacher ratio seems to matter more in the case of the enrolment of girls
than that of boys, where it explains initial enrolment (ever been to
school) but not current enrolment. In India, most studies tend to concur
that mid-day meals have a significant positive influence on school
participation and, probably, more so in the case of girls. However,
tracing the precise influence of specific aspects of school quality turns
out to be a difficult task. According to  Dreze and  Kingdon, this is
partially to be expected, because the crucial school quality variables (e.g.
teacher motivation) remain unobserved.  Tilak (2002) reports that
household expenditure on education is nearly unitary elastic to
government expenditure on education, but the effect of pupil-teacher3
ratio is not statistically significant. However, other school-related
variables such as the availability of school within the habitation and
incentives for attending school (mid-day meal, textbooks, uniform) are
found to reduce household expenditure considerably and, hence, may
affect demand for schooling positively. The question of participation or
non-participation in schooling is not examined here.
Our results suggest that wide variation in school participation across
Indian states may be because of two factors: the efficiency of public
expenditure and the influence of the demand-side factors. Another
important feature is the scale of funding with respect to child population
and the size of the state. This question is discussed in the Indian context
in Sections III, IV, and V. Section III starts by exploring the link
between the rate of growth of expenditure and educational outcomes for
16 major states of India. Then, it explores whether public expenditure
per child over a period makes an impact on educational outcomes. The
results do not show a strong link with enrolment ratios. To explain this,
the demand-side factors for enrolment, as shown by the MIMAP-India
survey results for the reference year 1994-95, are explored. In Section
IV we look at the link between public expenditure and private
expenditure by households. Again the link does not turn out to be strong.
Based on the discussion in Sections III and IV, we segregate the 32
states and Union Territories in terms of the technical efficiency of
expenditure into 16 efficient and 16 inefficient geographical regions
(states and Union Territories) and try and explore the link between
public spending and educational outcomes. The results suggest a link
between public spending and the quality of education, and from there to
the rate of enrolment for efficient states. Thus, the efficiency of
expenditure and the demand-side factors tend to explain the lack of link
between public spending and educational outcomes. It also seems
plausible that in efficient states, public activism due to a higher level of
awareness results in ensuring greater public spending and also possibly
maintaining the higher level of efficiency of expenditure.4
The point raised in the third question, too, has seen a growth in
literature in terms of the broader issue of impact of adjustment on public
spending. Studies of public expenditure patterns and their outcomes
across regions, and at times even within regions, have shown vastly
differing results. Bourguignon and  Morrisson (1992) report that the
inter-country picture with respect to social expenditures is more diverse
for the African countries, as compared to the Latin American and Asian
ones. In Morocco, social expenditure as a percentage of GDP fell in the
adjustment years (1983 to 1986), although the share of social
expenditure in the total government spending did not decline. In both
Indonesia and Malaysia, social expenditures were protected during the
reform period. The study presents a confusing picture regarding the
impact of reforms on the social sector, because of its choice of the same
period for all the three sets of indicators, i.e. expenditure, maintenance
of service, and outcome indicators. According to Hicks and Kubisch
(1984), the overall picture is that the social sector was comparatively
less vulnerable (subject to smaller reduction as compared to that in the
total expenditure) to public expenditure reduction in a number of
countries during the seventies and the eighties. Social sector expenditure
increased in Brazil, Indonesia, and the Philippines during this period,
despite cuts in government spending. In the case of Turkey, Guyana, and
Sudan, social expenditures were found to be vulnerable. In times of
austerity, social sectors, administration, and defence were generally
protected, while infrastructure and production sectors were subject to
large reductions. Whenever a cut was needed in the social sector, capital
expenditure was affected more than recurrent expenditure. But,
empirical evidence after the eighties does not support all the findings of
Hicks and Kubisch. Taylor (1993) observed that countries affected by
shocks adjusted in significantly different ways, depending on both
internal and external factors such as institutions, macroeconomic
structures, and their socio-economic environments (Bourguignon and
Morrisson 1992; Sahn 1987). Therefore, outcomes, including those with
respect to expenditure changes (not necessarily cuts), were bound to
differ. Moreover, the level of public spending has not always been
related to development. This difference is sought to be captured in this5
study by looking at the divergent performances of the states within
India. We begin by looking at the overall expenditure on elementary
education in India in Section VI, and then at the variations across 16
major states of India in Section VII. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. Is there a case for public spending on elementary education?
In order to answer this question we look at the vast literature on
linking education to growth, in recognising the political factors in
developing countries that emphasised education at the time of
independence, and in establishing the public good character of
education.
Elementary education and economic growth
Elementary education is considered an important contributor to
economic growth. With the work of Schultz (1961), the investment
approach to education gained currency, over-riding Keynes’ influence
that considered education as consumption good, based on who made the
decision to purchase. The instrumental role of education in achieving
economic development is now widely acknowledged. Various estimates
of rates of return to education suggest that investment in education may
be more productive than investment in physical capital, and the rates of
return are higher at lower levels of education ( Psacharopoulos 1993;
Tilak 1987; Blaug et al. 1969). The literature indicates that a substantial
proportion of the rate of growth of the economies may be attributed to
the rise in the educational level of the workforce. The New Growth
theories have tried to explain sustained long-run growth by an unceasing
accumulation of knowledge based on the argument that investment in
human capital is likely to yield constant or increasing returns (Romer
1986; Lucas 1988). This has been held to explain the divergent growth
profiles of nations, whereby the less developed economies have failed to
catch up with the developed economies. In 1950, a threshold adult
literacy rate of 40 per cent was found to be a necessary, though not
sufficient, condition for attaining a per capita income above $200 by
Bowman and Anderson (1963). Lau et al. (1993) attributed nearly a
quarter of Brazil’s economic growth during the 1970s to the increase in6
the average education of the workforce.  Mathur (1993) also found a
positive association between stocks of human capital and economic
development that was stronger at increasingly higher levels of education.
Even in terms of reduction in income inequality, the contribution of
primary education is more significant. In agriculture, primary schooling
affects productivity positively, especially when technology is changing
rapidly (Chaudhri 1979). The level of education in a society (i.e. the
proportion of population receiving some education) has also been found
to be positively correlated to decline in fertility, improved child health,
reduced infant mortality, and greater social and gender equity (World
Bank 1997). Education, particularly mass primary education, has been
projected as one of the vital ingredients in the success of East Asian
economies (World Bank 1993). Therefore, most governments adopt a
pro-elementary education strategy in their development plans.
Historical factors
During their struggle for independence, most of the Third World
countries had realised the need for broad-based mass education and were
acutely aware of the gap between them and the developed countries.
Education was accorded high priority by the governments of the Third
World countries and the subsequent explosion in education narrowed the
gap considerably. The most impressive increase took place in enrolment
in higher education, which grew from less than a million in 1950 to 18
million in 1981, at almost 19.8 per cent per year (Patel 1985).
After independence, the political leadership in India sought to make
mass education a basis of the national reconstruction, the aim being a
carryover from the objectives of the struggle for independence.
Education would not only serve as a vehicle for the economic
independence of the individual but would be a harbinger of social
change, assuming a special role in breaking economic and caste barriers.
The Directive Principles of the Indian Constitution enshrined the
objective of free compulsory education for all children till the age of 14,
and protective discrimination in favour of the weaker sections of the
population. There has been an improvement in literacy rates as well as7
other indicators of human development over time, but in comparison
with some of the other Asian economies like South Korea, Sri Lanka and
China, it fades into insignificance (Table I). But even within India, we
find a wide diversity in human development profiles across states. While
Kerala’s performance is comparable to Asian countries with a high
human development record, states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar show
levels of human development comparable to sub-Saharan Africa. This
further makes it important to look at the role of the state in improving
education.













India 62.4 71 62
Kerala 72.0 12 93
China 69.8 38 83




Source: Govt. of India (2000).
Some of the least developed countries today spend as much, if not
higher, a share of their GDP and national budgets on social services as
the industrialised countries (United Nations 1996). The problem is not
just reduction or misallocation in resources across sectors of the
economy, but is also one of misallocation within sectors and of the
inefficiency of their use. It is in this context that the review of the impact
of reforms initiated in India since 1991 on public expenditure on
elementary education, and its link with educational quality and
outcomes, gains relevance. Differing economic structures and
performances prior to adjustment can result in disparate outcomes of
reform programmes, social and otherwise, expenditure levels
notwithstanding.8
Is education a public good or a private good?
We have seen the importance of expenditure on education for the
growth of the economy and also noted the growing perception that it
may be of greater relevance to the developing countries. But in the
current atmosphere of growing scrutiny of the nature of state
expenditures, we have to consider whether education is to be treated as a
public or a private good, and whether expenditure on education is to be
treated as consumption or investment. If it is seen as consumption good,
that is, private in nature, then the market mechanism may be regarded as
the most effective means of ensuring its adequate supply and state
expenditure on it must be reduced to increase investment in other areas
of greater importance like infrastructure. However, education not only
offers private monetary as well as non-monetary benefits to its
consumers but also has externalities associated with it, which confer
benefits to society at large, even to those who have not had any
education. Externalities associated with an average level of human
capital affect a worker’s productivity as much as the effect of her own
human capital (Lucas 1988). Thus, it combines in it the nature of both an
investment good and a consumption good (Blaug 1970) and public as
well as private good ( Musgrave 1959). Apart from its intrinsic
importance, education serves certain instrumental roles in ensuring the
freedom of a person (Dreze and Sen 1995), which not only guarantees
personal gains but also possesses social ramifications including
empowering the disadvantaged and reducing inequality.
There are a few practical problems in which the economist has a
more direct interest than those relating to the principles on which the
expense of the education of children should be divided between the state
and the parents (Marshall 1910: 217). The objective of the state in
incurring expenditure on education is linked to the macro effects of
education over a much longer time horizon, and so is different from that
of the individual who is concerned with the immediate returns of
education to him and his family over a lifetime. Education can not only
ensure economic growth with equity but also has externalities associated9
with it, which make the public financing of education imperative (Tilak
1989). The benefits that accrue to the individual in terms of higher
earnings are a reason why the individual should pick up a part of the
cost. If we look at the state as a supplier of education and the individual
as a buyer of it, then investments by both appear to be complementary;
and this may be the best model on grounds of equity
1. Hence, the right
balance between public and private expenditures is crucial to the success
of any educational policy or programme (Psacharapoulos and Woodhall
1985; Majumdar 1983).
III.  Public expenditure on elementary education and outcome
A question often asked with respect to public spending is the rate
of growth of expenditure. Assuming that public spending affects
educational outcomes with a lag of a couple of years, we try to see
whether there is any link between the rate of growth of expenditure
during 1991-92 and 1993-94 and the change in educational outcome
between 1992 and 1996. Next we look at the influence of average
spending per child over the period 1985-86 to 1993-94 on educational
outcomes in 1996. Then we include a discussion on the demand side to
explain the results.
Table II presents four indicators, namely, enrolment ratio and
dropout rate for educational achievements, and pupil-teacher ratio, along
with the number of schools per 100 sq. km, for the level and quality of
educational services. However, we were unable to find any relationship
between the rate of growth of expenditure and the educational
achievements of the state during the reforms period. For example, if we
compare the rate of growth in expenditure during the period 1991-92 to
1993-94 (given in Table XIII) with the difference in enrolment ratio
between 1992 and 1996, we find that Kerala, with a negative growth rate
in expenditure, experienced a tremendous increase in enrolment ratio.
But Orissa, Gujarat, and Andhra Pradesh, even with a positive rate of
                                                                
1 Milton Friedman (1955) has presented a laissez-faire view of financing education where the primary responsibility
of the state is to enforce contracts, prevent coercion and keep markets free. There can be three reasons for making
an exception: when monopoly or market imperfections exist, where external or neighbourhood effects are important,
and thirdly, in favour of those who cannot take responsible decisions like children.10
growth in expenditure, experienced a decline in enrolment ratio. Even if
we include 1994-95 and 1995-96 on the expenditure side, the story does
not change much since Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh show a higher rate
of growth in expenditure than Kerala. Similar results are found in the
case of dropout. Assam, Gujarat, and Punjab experienced an increase
despite a positive rate of growth of expenditure, while Uttar Pradesh and
West Bengal experienced a decline despite a negative rate of growth of
expenditure. Similarly, when we look at the level of services, we find
that Orissa, with a very high rate of growth of expenditure, shows no
improvement in the level of services. States like  Haryana and Uttar
Pradesh, with much lower or even negative rates of growth in
expenditure, show substantial improvement.
A variety of reasons may explain the results. One important factor
is the demand side, which may have much greater impact on the
outcome than the supply side (Pradhan and Roy 2003). Secondly, the
efficiency of expenditure may be different across states. Thus, while we
concentrate merely on pupil-teacher ratio, what may remain hidden is
the quality of teachers themselves. For example, in 1992 Tamil  Nadu
showed a much better performance than Bihar in terms of enrolment and
literacy in rural areas even though Bihar had a higher percentage of
qualified primary school teachers and primary schools within habitation.
But when we take “trained matriculate and above” for teachers, we find
the figures to be 26 per cent for Bihar and 51 per cent for Tamil Nadu.
Similarly, when we consider that only 30 per cent of the rural primary
schools in Bihar had usable blackboards, while the figure for Tamil
Nadu was 75 per cent, we find the reason for this apparent paradox (Pal
and Pant 1995). Thirdly, indicators like enrolment ratio and dropout rate
are also dependent on the rate of growth in population. If the rate is low,
even a low rate of growth of expenditure may influence the outcome
much more substantially, as seen in the case of Kerala and Tamil Nadu.11













19961992 1996 1992 1996
Andhra
Pradesh
72.8 69.6 75.94 62.82 65 52 20.6 20.6
Assam 81.3 96.3 69.22 70.96 40 36 44.1 47.7
Bihar 60.7 59.0 78.61 79.07 54 48 38.4 38.8
Gujarat 100.8 96.5 58.36 59.39 44 42 16.4 17.1
Haryana 39.9 73.1 35.56 23.91 88 43 14.3 16.5
Himachal
Pradesh
85.8 89.0 19.61 15.77 39 31 15.5 15.8
Karnataka 89.1 89.8 61.09 60.96 46 52 21.0 21.6
Kerala 63.8 92.0 2.4 1.96 48 32 25.0 25.0
Madhya
Pradesh
89.0 85.0 53.52 44.68 41 41 19.0 22.1
Maharashtra 82.6 100.
8
51.21 47.38 49 39 20.0 20.5
Orissa 88.8 77.3 69.24 61.21 35 35 34.0 34.8
Punjab 64.1 74.2 45.37 46.44 55 37 27.6 30.1
Rajasthan 67.2 81.0 81.88 64.77 47 40 11.9 13.6
Tamil Nadu 95.3 100.
6
38.85 34.74 57 47 27.5 27.8
Uttar
Pradesh
69.4 65.1 48.39 37.93 60 53 32.0 37.7
West Bengal 124.3 97.9 74.29 46.67 76 70 62.0 61.0
Total 80.1 80.8 52 46 24.2 25.8
All India 79.0 80.7 61.1 52.74 51 45 22.1 23.6
Source: Calculated from Govt. of India, 1993, and 1997b.
* Govt. of India, 1998b.12
Keeping in mind the above factors, a more relevant analysis may
be to relate the final outcome in 1996 to expenditures incurred by state
governments per child in the few years prior to that. The results have
been presented in Table III. Even here we do not find a very high
correlation between enrolment rate and public expenditure per child.
Again, the demand side and the efficiency of expenditure become
important variables that would help the transformation of expenditure
into a better outcome. The correlation with dropout rate is higher,
suggesting that public expenditure has a much higher impact on
retaining children at school rather than bringing about greater enrolment.
The impact on pupil-teacher ratio is the highest. The negative value is to
be expected, because pupil-teacher ratio shows the number of students
per teacher that would be expected to decline with greater expenditure.
Thus, public expenditure has a higher impact on improving the quality
of services. However, so far as infrastructure in terms of the number of
schools per 100 sq. km is concerned, we find a small but negative
correlation with expenditure. This is much more difficult to explain, but
it may be argued that the link is reverse; the states with limited
educational infrastructure are spending more in order to overcome the
limitations of infrastructure, to catch up with the more advanced states.
Or due to political reasons, in some states there may be greater emphasis
on generating employment by increasing the number of teachers, while
less funds are available for building schools.

























128.8 69.6 62.82 52 20.6
Assam 205.8 96.3 70.96 36 47.713
Bihar 137.4 59.0 79.07 48 38.8
Gujarat 215.6 96.5 59.39 42 17.1
Haryana 149.7 73.1 23.91 43 16.5
Himachal
Pradesh
360.8 89.0 15.77 31 15.8
Karnataka 182.1 89.8 60.96 52 21.6
Kerala 303.4 92.0 1.96 32 25.0
Madhya
Pradesh
137.5 85.0 44.68 41 22.1
Maharashtra 186.0 100.8 47.38 39 20.5
Orissa 157.0 77.3 61.21 35 34.8
Punjab 161.5 74.2 46.44 37 30.1
Rajasthan 149.2 81.0 64.77 40 13.6
Tamil Nadu 213.5 100.6 34.74 47 27.8
Uttar
Pradesh
117.8 65.1 37.93 53 37.7
West Bengal 114.4 97.9 46.67 70 61.0
Total 156.8 80.8 46 25.8








Source: Government of India, 1993 and 1997a.
* Government of India, 1995: Average expenditure for 1985-86
to 1993-94 has been divided by child population in 1991.
Thus, merely public expenditure on education does not explain
differences across states in educational achievements. While it does tend
to explain the differences in the quality of education to some extent, it
does not explain the educational achievements to the same extent. There
is a need to look at the demand side and to analyse whether public and
private expenditures on education are complementary. Also, an
important feature of state financing is the proportion of spending that
goes to elementary education.14
Given these factors, along with the above analysis, which shows that
there is more to educational attainment than merely a public supply of
education, it is necessary to look at the causes of non-enrolment as
investigated by the MIMAP-India Survey (Pradhan and Roy 2003). In
the case of rural areas, the household response (Figure I) shows that the
major reasons for non-enrolment are unconstrained demand (interest-
related factors being 51 per cent) and constrained demand (economic
factors accounting for 39 per cent). The NSSO results of the 35th round
for 1980-81 also confirmed these two as important factors in non-
enrolment. This re-establishes that demand reasons, and more so the
interest-related factors rather than economic factors, are more important
than other reasons in explaining non-enrolment and dropouts in India.
Supply-related factors such as “school too far”, “school dysfunctional”,
and “teacher’s attitude discouraging”, account for only 2 per cent.
Similarly, custom- and health-related factors each account for only 4 per
cent. As compared to the above-poverty-line group (48 per cent), a
larger percentage (52 per cent) of the population in the below-poverty-
line category (Figures II and III) attribute their non-enrolment to
unconstrained demand (interest-related factors). However, constrained
demand is the next prominent reason of non-enrolment for both above-
poverty-line and below-poverty-line categories of population, although
the degree is less for the former (38 per cent) than the latter (40 per
cent). The state has to deal with the interest-related factors in more
innovative ways; merely an increase in state funding may not be enough.
This seems to be one of the primary reasons why we do not find a close
link between state expenditure and educational attainment. Hence, in
rural areas, the major reason for non-enrolment is unconstrained
demand, which negates the popular perception that poverty or financial
constraint is the major factor for poor households.
In urban areas, however, constrained demand (52 per cent) is the
major reason for non-enrolment (Figure IV). But, a contrast is observed
between the poor and non-poor in urban areas. While constrained
demand (57 per cent) is the major reason for the non-enrolment of the
poor (Figure V), unconstrained demand (45 per cent) is the major reason15
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for the non-enrolment of the non-poor (Figure VI). Thus, based on the
above data, among the reasons for the non-enrolment of various groups
of population on the basis of places of residence and the level of
poverty, the primacy of demand factors (either unconstrained or
constrained) is established beyond any doubt. On the contrary, supply-,
custom- and health-related factors, which are no doubt important, rank
lower as reasons of non-enrolment as stated by the respondents of the
MIMAP-India Survey.
In this context, it is important to note that most studies for India
have estimated the returns to primary education to be low ( Kingdon
1999). The returns to education are generally seen to go up with the
level of education, contrary to the conventional worldwide pattern. As
Kingdon notes, this seems to be consistent with the suggestion that over
time the rates of return to primary education may have collapsed in
many countries. This may explain the low interest in acquiring
education.  Pradhan and  Subramanian  examine the role of returns to
education in the household decision-making process on school
participation in a modelling framework by explicitly taking “the lack of
interest” as a proxy for returns to education. They also find that even after
controlling for household variables, wage rates remain significant in
explaining school participation. Another important conclusion from their
study is that education-based welfare programmes not only have
significant impact on the decision to send children to school, but also
improve the performance of the expected returns to education.
The importance of demand-side factors does not imply that the state has
no role to play in expanding the educational base. What it implies is that
government spending on education has to be accompanied by other
programmes to address non-monetary constraints that individuals face in
their decision to attend school (Inchauste 2000). Public expenditure has
to be directed towards inducing the
demand for elementary education. For
example, education-based welfare
programmes such as mid-day meals
and improvements in the quality of16
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schools may be  demand-inducing. The link between education and
employment opportunities has to be made stronger and needs to be
clearly perceived by the population. Besides, custom- and health-related
factors might also be a cause of lack of interest that can be taken care of
by the state. In the case of the poor, the state can also bring about a
change by easing the economic constraints, particularly in the urban
areas.
IV.  The role of private expenditure
on education
At this stage, it may also be worthwhile
to examine the link between public
expenditure and private expenditure on elementary education. Does
higher spending by the government bring forth higher spending by the
households? The correlation between the two turns out to be very small,
suggesting no link between public and private expenditure on
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elementary education across states (Table IV). However, we may note
that household expenditure on elementary education is very high,
contrary to the popular perception that education is mostly free in India.
Even households in rural areas belonging to the lower socio-economic
group spend considerable amount on books, uniform and fees (including
examination and other fees) (Tilak 2002). This, coupled with low rates
of return to lower levels of education, suggests why there is a lack of
interest in acquiring education. The positive response to welfare
programmes such as mid-day meals, noted by a number of studies,
suggests that government spending in these areas is likely to induce
demand for education and increase enrolments.
Taking a log of both the variables and then regressing private
household expenditure (primary) per student on public expenditure
(elementary) per child, we find a strong and statistically significant
positive relationship between the two [Table IV, regression (1)]. This is
similar to  Tilak’s (2002) observation that there is nearly unitary
elasticity between government and private household expenditure,
suggesting complementarity between the two. It must be noted that the
exercises conducted in these two studies are different because the
variables considered are very different. One,  Tilak takes the average
household expenditure per student on elementary education, calculated
from HDI survey data for rural households. We take the average
household expenditure per primary class student taken from the NSSO
survey. The advantage of using the NSSO survey is that the sample size
is very large and includes urban and rural population. However, it does
not provide the average expenditure of households on elementary school
students. Second, public expenditure in our case is per child in order to
reflect the scale of funding for the state, whereas Tilak has taken public
expenditure per student. Also,  Tilak relates household expenditure in
rural areas to the total state expenditure per student. Rural households
are much more dependent on state education facilities, and so may be
affected much more by state expenditure than urban households. The
conclusions, however, are not very different. The ideal method for
looking at substitutatibility or complementarity between government and18
private expenditure on education would be to do a time series analysis.
The results could be substantially different for different states over time.
However, the paucity of data with respect to household expenditure on
education does not allow this. An interesting feature is that elasticity
with respect to per capita state domestic product, which may be taken as
a proxy for household incomes, comes out to be lower than that for
public expenditure, though more significant [Table IV, regression (2)].
Tilak too reports a very low elasticity of household expenditure on
education in general, and elementary education to household incomes.
Thus, if government expenditure on elementary education is reduced, the
result may be a decline in household expenditure, affecting enrolments
negatively.
Reflecting the highly significant relationship we found between the
log of per capita state domestic product and private expenditure per
student, a much higher level of correlation is observed between these
two than with public expenditure (Table V). This suggests that economic
factors do play a role in higher demand for education. Again, comparing
with the results obtained by  Tilak, the link is clearly in the same
direction. It has to be noted that state domestic per capita is not merely
an indicator of household income. It is likely to be related to the level of
development of the state, measured by such factors as the share of
industry in total employment and state domestic product (SDP). Thus,
the relationship between household expenditure and SDP per capita may
also be indirect, through the perception of increased opportunity to
exploit the employment potential.























Himachal Pradesh 1344 Punjab 1162
Kerala 1209 Haryana 953




Tamil Nadu 846 Maharashtra 540
Rajasthan 701 Rajasthan 518
Karnataka 701 Uttar Pradesh 507
Maharashtra 697 Tamil Nadu 464
Orissa 654 West Bengal 433
Haryana 605 Andhra Pradesh 430
Madhya Pradesh 557 Gujarat 423
Punjab 545 Madhya Pradesh 333
Bihar 474 Bihar 330
Andhra Pradesh 446 Karnataka 294
Uttar Pradesh 431 Orissa 284
West Bengal 376 Assam 251
Simple correlation between public and private expenditure = 0.06
Regression:
(1) ln (priexp)  = b1 ln (govexp)
Elasticity coefficient(b1) = 0.943
(t –value =  46.749)
Adj R-squared               =  0.9927
(2) ln (priexp) = b2 ln (income)
Elasticity coefficient(b2) = 0.678
(t –value = 74.241)
Adj R-squared               = 0.9971
Source: * Govt. of India, 1993 & 1998a (Average public
expenditure for the period has been divided by the estimated child
population in Sep., 1993). ** NSSO, 1998.
Education constraints may be divided into resources, values,
incentives, and institutions (Dreze & Saran 1993). A higher level of
general education in a state is likely to strengthen the institutional
mechanism to demand more resources and better education from the
state, thus creating a positive impact on all the above factors mentioned
by Dreze and Saran. The correlation between the literacy rate in 1991
and public expenditure per child comes out to be fairly high (Table V).20
Private expenditure on education, too, is positively associated with the
literacy rate in 1991, suggesting that a higher level of education has a
positive influence on the demand side, possibly by reinforcing the
positive attitude towards education. The quality of education, too,
influences demand positively.
Table V: Factors explaining higher private
expenditure











Himachal Pradesh 8747 63.86
Karnataka 9359 56.04
Kerala 9004 89.81





Tamil Nadu 10222 62.66
Uttar Pradesh 5872 41.6











Source: * Same as table 4 above
              ** Economic Survey, 1999-2000.
V.  Technical efficiency of elementary education across states
Having seen that the efficiency of expenditure can be an important
factor in explaining the divergent performances of states in terms of
enrolment and dropout, this section considers the technical efficiency of
states based on two inputs: schools, as a measure of the capacity, and the
number of teachers. The efficiency of factor inputs in generating
educational output (such as enrolment and dropout) can be low due to a
variety of factors. One of the problems can be the need to reach out to a
larger population over a wider geographical region. Inefficiency would
come due to decreasing returns to scale. Hence, factor productivity
would appear to go down. The other can be inefficiency, because factor
inputs that should be measured by technical efficiency are not being
utilised properly. It must be noted here that this technical efficiency can
come also due to a lack of certain complementary inputs or because the
quality of inputs is bad, which may not have been accounted for. For
example, schools may not have roofs or blackboards; in certain areas
there might be teachers but schools may not have been built; and the
teachers may not be trained and hence may not be good. There is
evidence that these reasons are important in the Indian context. The
PROBE (1999) survey, for instance, found the following with respect to
government schools: (a) only a fourth of the sample schools had at least
two teachers, two all-weather classrooms, and some teaching aids; (b) at
the time of the investigator’s visit, one-third of the headmasters were
absent, one-third of the schools had a single teacher present, and about
half of the schools had no teaching activity; (c) in many schools class I
students were systematically neglected. These represent serious flaws in
the schooling process. If teachers are absent from schools or do not
teach, the overall teacher-pupil ratio would not be of any meaning.22
Similarly, since education is a cumulative process, a systematic neglect
of education at the early stage implies that students’ current level of
achievement as well as interest in schooling would decline.
It is difficult to account for all the factors that go into educational
output, due to lack of data. Hence, the results presented here can be only
taken to be indicative and not conclusive. The ranking is expected to be
due to the aggregate effect of all the factors mentioned above and more.
However, it is precisely these effects that we are not able to trace when
we deal with aggregate data across states. So the conclusion that with the
same level of inputs some states would do better is important.
The method adopted was input-oriented Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) with variable returns to scale. DEA makes no
assumption about production function and hence is more appropriate for
studying the efficiency of conversion of inputs into outputs with respect
to education, because no good estimate of appropriate frontier for
education is available ( Harbison and  Hanushek 1992). It measures
efficiency by ranking the “producers” from within the sample in order to
establish the production frontier based on certain very unrestrictive
assumptions such as convex production frontier. A parametric approach
based on the assumption of a functional form of the production function
can be considered doubtful, given the small sample. DEA also is better
than Free Disposable Hull (FDH) analysis, used by Gupta, Honjo, and
Verhoeven (1997), and Clements (1999), because the latter, with no
restrictions on the shape of the frontier, can identify very small
observations as inefficient. In the case of multiple inputs and outputs,
FDH is even more limited.
Table VI ranks the states in terms of technical efficiency with
variable returns to scale and then by scale efficiency. West Bengal and
Delhi turn out to be the most efficient. Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh,
both large states, turn out to have the problem of scale inefficiency.
Thus, the size of the state matters, because a larger area, particularly
rural, would imply spreading the resources thin, resulting in decreasing23
returns to scale. The usage of inputs, therefore, would also show
inefficiency, because reaching the last child involves a much larger
increase in input than may be shown by the performance of states with
relatively low enrolment levels.  Kerala and  Himachal  Pradesh are
ranked among relatively inefficient states, but that is primarily because
the inputs by the states are very high, which has helped in creating very
high levels of enrolments in these states
2. But the interesting feature is
that most of the states are in the region of increasing returns to scale,
implying that they can expand enrolments faster if they increase the
inputs.
Having so distinguished the states by the level of technical
efficiency, we test the hypothesis that the relatively efficient states
would show a stronger link between enrolment and public expenditure.
One of the channels through which this would work is the impact of
public expenditure on the quality of education, and hence outcome. As
can be seen from Table VII, public expenditure per child does determine
the rate of enrolment across states. The coefficient for the efficient states
is higher than for the inefficient states, suggesting that it makes greater
impact on enrolment depending upon the efficiency of expenditure.
However, it explains less of the variation in rates of enrolment across
efficient states than the inefficient states, as seen from a lower value of
adj-R
2. The reason becomes clear from the next regression, where we
include the household annual expenditure per student. They together
explain a higher amount of variation in enrolment across efficient states
than inefficient states. The household expenditure term is insignificant
for inefficient states, while both public expenditure and private
expenditure turn out to be significant in explaining enrolment in efficient
states. The coefficients are also higher for the efficient states. This
suggests that where public expenditure is efficient, private expenditure
tends to complement it in increasing the educational outcome.
                                                                
2 These states have extremely low dropout rates (see Table II). Hence, if we account for dropout rates and look at
retention rates, these states will turn out as relatively efficient. On the other hand, a state like Bihar, with the highest
dropout rate, would move down in the rankings. These states may be considered as outliers.24
Table VI: Ranking of states by technical efficiency
(constant returns)
State Crste Vrste Scale
West Bengal 1 1 1
Delhi 0.92 0.943 0.976irs
Uttar Pradesh 0.619 1 0.619drs
Madhya Pradesh 0.615 0.615 1
Andhra Pradesh 0.611 0.612 0.999irs
Punjab 0.532 0.538 0.988irs
Maharashtra 0.507 0.606 0.836drs
Karnataka 0.495 0.496 0.998irs
Haryana 0.478 0.484 0.987irs
Bihar 0.476 0.476 0.999
Orissa 0.463 0.466 0.994irs
Rajasthan 0.462 0.463 0.998irs
Tamil Nadu 0.459 0.46 0.999irs
Assam 0.431 0.434 0.994irs
Gujarat 0.389 0.39 0.997irs
Tripura 0.346 0.374 0.925irs
Pondicherry 0.321 0.41 0.783irs
Daman & Diu 0.313 1 0.313irs
J&K 0.31 0.32 0.968irs
D&N Haveli 0.309 0.819 0.377irs
Goa 0.303 0.372 0.815irs
Himachal Pradesh 0.295 0.307 0.962irs
Kerala 0.293 0.296 0.993irs
Chandigarh 0.289 0.432 0.668irs
Meghalaya 0.278 0.312 0.892irs
Manipur 0.223 0.254 0.88irs
Nagaland 0.216 0.245 0.879irs
Arunachal Pradesh 0.204 0.253 0.804irs
Mizoram 0.191 0.244 0.783irs
Sikkim 0.187 0.27 0.693irs
A & N 0.156 0.269 0.581irs25
Lakshadweep 0.137 0.678 0.202irs
Source: Calculated on the basis of data provided in Government of
India, 1997a.
Note: crste = technical efficiency from CRS (Constant Returns to Scale)
DEA
         vrste = technical efficiency from VRS (Variable Returns to Scale)
DEA
         scale = scale efficiency = crste/vrste
         irs    =  increasing returns to scale
         drs   =  decreasing returns to scale
Looking at the impact of public expenditure per child on the quality of
education, as measured by the number of teachers per 1,000 students, we
find that the impact is insignificant in inefficient states and significant in
efficient states. The small value of the coefficients is to be expected,
because we are dealing with the ratios of very large numbers. Thus,
whether or not public expenditure affects the quality of education
depends on the efficiency of utilisation of public funds and hence, so
does the impact of this expenditure on educational outcome. The next
stage is to look at whether the quality of education makes an impact on
the rate of enrolment or not. As can be seen from the regression results
presented in Table VIII, teacher–pupil ratio and the number of schools
per sq. km are significant in explaining the rate of enrolment in efficient
states but both the variables are completely insignificant in the case of
inefficient states. The high value of the constant term, along with the
fact that it remains significant in both the cases, may be taken to reflect
the importance of demand-side factors. If we rank efficiency based on
variable returns to scale, it turns out that in the case of efficient states
teacher–pupil ratio becomes the most significant and the constant term
becomes insignificant. The value of adj-R
2 also improves. However, in
the case of inefficient states, the results do not change much. It may be
argued that enrolment depends to a great extent on the demand-side
factors, but the quality of education and infrastructure, which can be
influenced by government policy and expenditure, can increase the rate
of enrolment and can even push demand for education.26
We further look at what determines private and public
expenditures. The link would come from, one, a higher capacity to
spend, resulting in greater spending on education, and two, greater
awareness because of a high level of educational attainment in a
geographical region, resulting in greater spending. A higher level of
awareness would imply that public activism could result in greater
expenditure by the government on education, and also greater efficiency
in expenditure. It could also motivate the people to spend more on
education if they have the capacity to do so. The capacity to spend
would depend on the income levels of the households, which may be
proxied for by the per capita income of the state. However, a higher per
capita income would imply that the people can afford to pay for
education and hence the state would have less pressure to spend. We
regress public and private expenditure on the literacy rate (proxy for the
level of awareness) and per capita income (proxy for capacity to pay)
(Table IX). There is a problem here concerning the availability of data
on per capita income with respect to inefficient states, including Union
Territories. Hence, the number of observations is less. The results vary
across efficient and inefficient states. Overall, literacy only seems to be
significant (at 5 per cent) in explaining the variations across states in
public expenditure on elementary education per child. In efficient states,
literacy puts greater pressure on state governments to spend more on
elementary education. Private expenditure is related negatively to
literacy, suggesting that more informed population groups pressurise the
government to spend more, and they spend less. The sign with respect to
literacy is negative for private expenditure, but it is not significant in
explaining this expenditure. On the other hand, per capita income has the
reverse effect. Greater capacity to pay on the part of the people leads to
greater expenditure on education, and the government releases itself of
the burden. In inefficient states, literacy and per capita income both tend
to have a negative effect on private expenditure, while per capita income
has a positive effect on public expenditure. Both literacy and per capita
income are insignificant in explaining private expenditure. The link is
likely to be through the quality of education. Since the quality of27
education is bad, there might be a satisfaction with relatively a small
amount of education so that population groups with some educational
attainment do not put pressure on the government to increase
expenditure. They themselves would not be interested in spending on
education, because they do not perceive adequate benefits from it.
It may also be noted here that merely looking at pupil-teacher ratio
and its impact on school participation or attainment is not enough. Part
of the reason that pupil-teacher ratios do not seem to affect schooling is
that variations in pupil-teacher ratios, in general, are small. The issue is
also related to what the case would be if the demand for schooling
increases and also over time the absolute number of children getting
enrolled increases. There is hence a need to increase expenditure on
elementary education in order to meet the demand that may grow from
two sides: (1) an increase in the rate of enrolment, and (2) to keep up
with the rise in child population and hence an increase in absolute
numbers seeking education at the same level of rate of enrolment.
Table VII: Expenditure as a determinant of rate of enrolment
and quality of education
Dependent variable Independent























- 0.010 (1.29) -
2
R  (N=32) 0.7075 0.7139 0.2187
Efficient states
Constant 60.51 (5.31) 45.05 (3.99) 12.11 (3.87)
Pub exppe 0.0416 (2.49) 0.05 (3.47) .0126 (2.75)
Average -- 0.017 (2.60) -
2
R (N=16) 0.2581 0.4737 0.3038
Inefficient states
Constant 76.80 (3.68) 69.06 (1.93)
Pub exppe 0.0298 (3.81) 0.031 (3.38) .0026 (0.899)
Average -- 0.005 (0.27) --
2
R (N=16) 0.4734 0.4360 -0.0129
Note: Figures in parenthesis show the t-statistics.
Table VIII: The impact of quality variables on the rate of
enrolment









Efficient states Based on crste Based on vrste
Constant 54.62 (3.246) 23.63 (0.881)
Teachers-per-1000-pupils 1.25 (1.578) 2.94 (2.247)
Number of Schools per sq.
km.
0.19 (2.044) 0.28 (1.807)
2
R (N=16) 0.2412 0.353429
Inefficient states
Constant 160.19  (3.459) 153.379 (3.132)
Teachers-per-1000-pupils -0.155 (-0.131) -0.104 (-0.082)
Number of schools per sq.
km.
-0.196 (-0.388) -0.361 (-0.584)
2
R (N=16) -0.1402 -0.1188
Note: Figures in parenthesis show the t-statistics..






Constant -74.65 (0.075) -76.42 (0.24)
Literacy (1991) 24.37 (1.288) 3.19 (0.527)
Per capita income
(1995-96)
0.004 (0.067) 0.056 (2.971)
2
R  (N=27) 0.0116 0.3167
Efficient states
Constant -143.88 (0.504) -120.07 (0.238)
Literacy (1991) 22.25 (3.169) -3.37 (0.272)
Per capita income
(1995-96)
-0.041 (2.737) 0.092 (3.465)
2
R  (N=16) 0.3561 0.6088
Inefficient states
Constant 2862.933 (1.928) 1068.55 (2.264)
Literacy (1991) -29.899 (1.439) -1.88 (0.285)
Per capita income
(1995-96)
0.154 (1.803) -0.015 (0.551)
2
R  (N=11) 0.1907 0.1789
Note: Figures in parenthesis show the t-statistics..
VI.  Public expenditure on education in India30
The sources of finance for education in India are the central and
the state governments, local bodies, consumers of education (fees, etc.),
and foreign aid. Primary among these is the source of state governments.
However, the role of the central government is crucial because its
expenditure is of strategic importance. It not only expands existing
programmes, but also funds new programmes and initiatives.
The share of expenditure on education in GDP increased from 1.19 per
cent in 1951 (not given in the table) to 2.78 per cent in 1975-76 (Table
X), i.e. more than double the share. It peaked at 3.87 per cent in 1990-
91, after which it suffered a decline, from which it never recovered till
1998-99, and it even fell below the levels achieved in the eighties. The
target of 6 per cent of GDP (Government of India 1968) was never
achieved. Elementary education was always accorded the highest
priority in government budgets, but could never reach 50 per cent of the
total central and state government budgets on education (revenue
account).
The target of free and compulsory education for all below 14 years
of age—set in 1950, the target was to be attained by 1960—is yet to be
fulfilled till date. Although there has been progress, the current levels of
elementary enrolment continue to be low (Table XI). The fact that the
enrolment rates are lower for the below-poverty-line (BPL) households
as against the above-poverty-line (APL) households, and that they are
lower for rural areas as compared to urban areas, lays further emphasis
on the role of the state. The state needs to take care of the special
problems that the vulnerable groups may face to improve the educational
status of the population. Of special concern here is the status of women,
particularly so because their education has the most crucial effect on the
health and education of children. As can be seen from Table XI, their
position is worse in the case of the BPL group and in rural areas.























Source: Government of India, 2003.
A study by the Institute of Applied Manpower Research (IAMR) of the
level of educational deprivation for 1991 and 1996 in sixteen major
states has considered financial allocation as one of the major variables in
measuring the educational status of the states (IAMR 1999). The study
concludes that per capita allocations were low for the states with higher
deprivation values and high for the states with lower deprivation values
and that a substantial increase is necessary to reduce deprivation levels.
Since a greater part of the spending effort is undertaken by the states,
their expenditure patterns need to be reviewed. This needs to be
complemented by the pattern of household spending. Since education
expenditure on the capital account is very small, the expenditure on the
revenue account alone has been considered.32
Source: Pradhan and Roy, 2003.
VII. The variations across states
While most states show a marked increase in revenue expenditure on
elementary education in the period immediately preceding the reforms,
Uttar  Pradesh and  Orissa show the highest increase with almost a
doubling of expenditure (Table XII). Expenditure on elementary
education was hit hardest in 1991-92, when ten out of the sixteen major
states we have considered showed a negative growth rate. It picked up
slowly after that, but not all. The states that have been of greatest
concern like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal in fact suffered a
decline even in absolute amount when we compare the 1990-91 figures
with the 1995-96 figures. Andhra  Pradesh and Punjab increased the
expenditure only marginally. If we look at the figures for all the states
and UTs, then too we find much higher annual growth rates for the pre-
reforms period than for the reforms period (Table XIII). However, for
the sixteen major states considered here, a higher annual rate of growth
is observed for the entire reforms period from 1990-91 to 1999-00. This
has been due to the exceptional performance of four states—Assam,
Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Kerala. If we ignore the one exceptional year
of 1987-88, the same result does not hold for the expenditure incurred by
the Centre. This was the year when the National Policy on Education
was brought within the budget provisions and so we find nearly a 500
Table XI
Elementary enrolment rates (%) and gender disparity













per cent increase in expenditure. Barring this exception, the Centre’s
contribution to elementary education seems to have increased steadily in
the reforms period. But such stability is not found in the contributions
made by the states. West Bengal shows a negative growth rate for the
period 1990-91 to 1995-96 and a small 2 per cent rate of growth for the
entire reforms period. For the ten-year period from 1985-86 to 1995-96,
Andhra  Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal have shown the greatest
instability in expenditure, in that comparatively there were many years
in which there was a negative growth rate (not shown in the table). In the
case of West Bengal, as already noted above, it was entirely
concentrated in the reforms period.
Comparing the average annual growth rates for the pre-reforms
and the reforms periods (Table XIII), we generally find a sharp decline
in the rate of growth of revenue expenditure on elementary education in
the period immediately following the introduction of reforms (viz. 1991-
92 to 1993-94). That tends to get corrected when we consider a longer
period in the reforms period up to 1995-96. The exceptions are Gujarat,
which shows a continuous increase, and Karnataka, which shows an
increase in the initial period of reforms and a subsequent decline (can be
seen from Table XII).  Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Assam managed to
overcome the initial shock of reforms and the rates of growth from
1991-92 to 1995-96 turn out to be higher than from 1985-86 to 1990-91.
On the other hand, Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, and
Punjab have shown a lower rate of growth for the period 1990-91 to
1995-96 than in the initial years of reforms. But Bihar, Uttar Pradesh,
and West Bengal show a negative growth rate for the reforms period up
to 1995-96. Even considering the period up to 1999-00, since the
introduction of reforms only six states show a higher annual growth rate
than the pre-reforms period. Overall, reforms have had a negative impact
on the rate of growth of revenue expenditure on elementary education,
and the recovery has not been strong enough even over a longer time
horizon except for Kerala, Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Assam.34
If we look at the period between 1985-86 and 1993-94, Orissa, Himachal
Pradesh, and Karnataka had the highest rates of growth. Gujarat, West
Bengal, and  Kerala had the lowest rates of growth of elementary
education expenditure, in that order. However, the period up to 1995-96
shows that Orissa, Rajasthan, and  Himachal Pradesh had the highest
growth rates while Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and Punjab had the
lowest. For the period up to 1999-00, it is found that Punjab comes to
the bottom of the list and  Himachal  Pradesh moves to the second
position. Punjab and West Bengal, thus, were affected the most by the
introduction of reforms in terms of expenditure on elementary education.
But looking merely at rates of growth of public expenditure on education
is not enough. What we need to do is to complement the analysis of
trends in financing elementary education with the results in terms of
educational achievements and the level as well as quality of services.
















Andhra Pradesh 100 123.3 119.2 130.2 124.2 120.8 188.3
Assam 100 132.7 144.6 157.5 194.6 209.0 298.6
Bihar 100 157.6 145.9 146.6 154.3 179.3 282.4
Gujarat 100 111.7 114.1 121.8 143.0 148.9 196.8
Haryana 100 155.7 148.1 159.4 191.4 178.0 225.1
Himachal
Pradesh
100 180.6 155.3 211.5 197.1 210.8 316.4
Karnataka 100 136.4 137.8 185.8 169.9 191.1 249.7
Kerala 100 125.5 113.3 124.3 153.4 159.7 213.8
Madhya Pradesh 100 151.1 151.1 161.0 186.1 188.2 201.1
Maharashtra 100 127.1 143.5 134.0 183.6 164.2 239.2
Orissa 100 186.1 209.5 228.8 271.6 264.2 377.2
Punjab 100 133.7 122.0 144.2 136.4 141.0 164.7
Rajasthan 100 165.3 151.9 165.2 216.1 225.4 313.335
Tamil Nadu 100 150.7 156.1 157.3 163.4 170.8 203.2
Uttar Pradesh 100 210.1 162.5 170.4 180.2 215.6 278.1
West Bengal 100 150.9 131.8 124.4 129.2 123.3 180.2
Total 100 149.0 142.1 150.6 201.1 225.6 366.7
Total (All States
& UTs)
100 148.8 142.2 150.2 169.6 177.1 239.6






Grand Total 100 148.4 142.4 151.6 180.9 195.8 259.2
Source: Government of India, 1995, and Government of India, Analysis
of Budgeted Expenditure on Education, various years.
We arrived at the inter-state differences in public expenditure per
child, by taking the average of expenditures at constant prices (base
1993-94) for the period 1993-94 to 1995-96 and dividing it by the 6–14
year child population on September 30, 1993. The highest spender came
out to be Himachal Pradesh, while the lowest was West Bengal. Of the
16 major states considered here, seven states had expenditure less than
the average of Rs 654. Orissa is just at the average when expenditure by
the Centre is included and slightly above the average when only the
combined average for states and Union Territories is considered. The
worst performers turn out to be West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra
Pradesh and Bihar, in that order. The best are  Himachal  Pradesh,
Kerala, Gujarat, Assam, and Tamil Nadu, in a descending order.




































Andhra Pradesh 4.27 1.85 0.15 4.82 3.36 2.19 4.62
Assam 5.82 5.86 7.95 9.43 5.84 6.88 8.13
Bihar 9.52 -2.37 -0.42 6.69 4.90 4.44 7.70
Gujarat 2.24 2.92 5.06 6.50 2.50 3.64 4.96
Haryana 9.26 0.78 4.22 4.18 6.00 6.71 5.97
Himachal
Pradesh
12.54 5.41 1.77 6.43 9.81 7.02 8.58
Karnataka 6.41 10.84 4.49 6.95 8.05 5.45 6.75
Kerala 4.66 -0.32 4.09 6.09 2.76 4.37 5.58
Madhya
Pradesh
8.60 2.15 4.25 3.23 6.14 6.41 5.12
Maharashtra 4.91 1.79 7.64 7.28 3.73 6.26 6.43
Orissa 13.22 7.14 7.86 8.17 10.90 10.51 9.95
Punjab 5.98 2.55 0.40 2.34 4.68 3.15 3.63
Rajasthan 10.57 -0.01 5.51 7.36 6.48 8.01 8.50
Tamil Nadu 8.54 1.45 1.64 3.38 5.83 5.03 5.20
Uttar Pradesh 16.01 -6.75 -3.02 3.16 6.89 6.07 7.58
West Bengal 8.58 -6.23 -3.06 1.99 2.77 2.59 4.29
Total 8.30 0.37 6.18 10.53 5.25 7.23 9.72
Total (All states
& UTs)
8.28 0.30 2.65 5.43 5.21 5.43 6.44
Centre (Total) 44.39 13.43 31.54 23.00 31.90 37.81 30.25
Grand total 8.21 0.72 4.04 6.40 5.34 6.11 7.04
Source: Calculations based on Govt. of India, 1995 and  Analysis of
Budgeted Expenditure on Education, various years.
It must be noted here that Kerala and Himachal Pradesh show the
lowest dropout rates and the best teacher–pupil ratio in 1996—the two
indicators, our analysis shows, are affected the most by public
expenditure. An interesting case is that of  Rajasthan, which is often37
clubbed with Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Rajasthan features among the
higher-than-average spenders on elementary education. Figure VII
shows the percentage of the total (plan + non-plan) budgeted revenue
expenditures that goes to elementary education for the worst performers
mentioned above. Bihar does provide a large share to elementary
education (although the absolute amount is very low). While it has gone
up for Uttar  Pradesh, it has been declining for  Haryana and West
Bengal. There seems to be an effort being made by Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh to take care of elementary education. Figure VIII presents the
share of elementary education on the revenue account in the total
budgeted expenditure on education for the better-performing states.
Orissa, which comes closest to the all-India average, has put in a higher
share for elementary education. Gujarat shows an increasing trend in
general. Himachal Pradesh has maintained a more than 50 per cent share
of elementary education. Kerala and Tamil Nadu show almost the same
levels of share of elementary education that is tending towards the 50
per cent level. Thus, in the reforms period there seems to be greater
stress being placed by the low-performing states of Bihar and Uttar
Pradesh on basic education in terms of allocation to elementary
education. West Bengal, on the other hand, not only spends less on
elementary education per child but is also reducing the share of
elementary education in the total expenditure on education. This could
lead to a dismal state of the education sector in this state.
Figure VII: Percentage share of elementary education in total expenditure (revenue 








































































Source: Government of India, Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure, various
years. Figures for 1999-00 are Budget Estimates.
Source: Government of India, Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure, various
years. Figures for 1999-00 are Budget Estimates.
VIII. Conclusion
Elementary education gains relevance because it is the base of the
educational pyramid, and the success of East Asian economies has given
further credence to the idea of having a wider educational base. Since
education has the nature of both a public and private good, there is a
case for the cost of education to be shared by both the state as well as the
individual. Further, in a poor country like India, elementary education
needs to be fully financed by the state, especially for the poorer groups.
The importance of public expenditure cannot be gainsaid,
particularly in retaining children in school and improving the quality of
services. Public expenditure per child and the rate of growth of
expenditure did not seem to have a strong influence on the rate of
enrolment for 16 major states of India. However, the argument that the
quality of schooling and public expenditure on education does not affect
educational output may be due to the fact that the efficiency of this
expenditure is ignored. Once the efficiency of expenditure is taken note
Figure VIII: Percentage share of elementary education in total  expenditure (revenue 
















































































of, the effect is seen to be stronger. In general, it may be argued that
some states employ better educational processes so that the link between
school input and educational outcome becomes stronger. In these states,
increases and decreases in public expenditure would influence outcome
strongly. While public expenditure may not directly influence private
expenditure on education, it certainly does have an effect via improved
quality and greater expenditure efficiency. Literacy rates as well as state
domestic product were seen to have a positive influence on education. A
higher level of education is seen to positively influence public
expenditure on education and may influence the government to improve
the quality of services. Higher per capita income has a strong link with
private expenditure on education, which may be related to both—a
higher capacity to incur expenditure as well as a perception of returns
from education. Thus, a virtuous cycle is likely to start with the demand-
and supply-side factors positively influencing each other. The state then
needs to take care of factors that influence demand for education, more
importantly, non-monetary constraints that generate interest in
education. The low rates of return to lower levels of education, noted in
the literature in the Indian context, coupled with the high expenditure
that households incur, tend to explain the lack of interest shown by
households in providing education for children. It also suggests that
government expenditure directed at reducing the expenditure of
households on books, uniform and examination and other fees  may
prove to be demand-inducing, and hence, increase enrolments.
Although elementary education has been given high priority by the
state in India in terms of the share of expenditure on elementary
education in GDP, the targeted level of 6 per cent was never achieved.
What is of great concern is that the enrolment rates remain low even
after 50 years of independence, particularly in the case of the poor,
women and those residing in rural areas. Public expenditure, thus,
assumes a very significant role, keeping in mind the externalities
associated with education. The state governments incur a major part of
the spending. Since spending is related to deprivation levels, the state
governments assume a special role in improving the educational level.40
The regional variations in educational achievements also suggest the
same conclusion.  Kerala and Himachal Pradesh, with the highest per
child public expenditure, have the lowest dropout rates and the lowest
number of students per teacher. The level of 50 per cent of the total
budgeted expenditure on education may be the level that other states
need to target.
The reforms brought a break in the growth rates of public
expenditure on elementary education, from which not all the states could
recover. Only the Centre maintained a continuous growth in expenditure.
The worst performers such as Uttar  Pradesh and Bihar showed the
greatest negative impact of reforms. The worst affected was West
Bengal. What is important is that the laggards in terms of educational
achievements seem to be spending more on elementary education in
order to correct the historical anomaly. This is an encouraging sign.
References
Blaug, M (1970): Introduction to Economics of Education, Allen Lane
the Penguin, London.
Blaug, M, P R G  Layard, and M  Woodhall (1969):  The causes of
Graduate Unemployment in India, Allen Lane the Penguin,
London.
Bowman, M J, and C A Anderson (1963): “Concerning the role of
Education in Development,” in C Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and
New States: The Quest of Modernity in Asia and Africa, Free Press,
Glencoe, Ill.
Bourguignon, Francois, and Christian Morrisson (1992): Adjustment and
Equity in Developing Countries: A New Approach, Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.41
Caldwell, John C (1980): “Mass Education as a Determinant of the
Timing of Fertility Decline,” Population and Development Review,
6(2), pp. 225-55.
Case, Anne, and Angus Deaton (1999): “School Inputs and Educational
Outcomes in South Africa,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Vol. 114(3), August, 1047-84.
Chaudhri, D P (1979):  Education, Innovations, and Agricultural
Development, Croom Helm, London.
Clements, Benedict (1999): “The Efficiency of Educational Expenditure
in Portugal,” IMF Working Paper, WP/99/179, December.
Dearden, Lorraine, Javier Ferri, and Costas Meghir (2002): “The Effect of
School Quality on Educational Attainment and Wages,” The Review
of Economics and Statistics, February, 84 (1), 1-20.
Dreze, J, and Geeta G Kingdon (1999): “School Participation in Rural
India,” Development Economics Discussion Paper Series No. 18,
STICERD, London School of Economics, London.
Dreze, J, and A Sen (1995): India: Economic Development and Social
Opportunity, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
Dreze, J, and M Saran (1993): “Primary Education and Economic
Development in China and India: Overview and Two Case
Studies,” Development Economics Research Programme,
STICERD, London School of Economics, London, DEP No. 47,
Sep.
Feinstein, Leon, and James Symons (1999): “Attainment in Secondary
School,” Oxford Economic Papers, 51, 300-321.42
Friedman, Milton (1955): The Role of Government in Education, in R
Solow (ed.) Economics and the Public Interest, Rutgers University
Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 124-25.
Government of India (1968):  National Policy on Education 1968,
Ministry of Education, New Delhi.
Government of India (1993): Selected Educational Statistics, Ministry of
Human Resources Development, New Delhi.
Government of India (1995): Budgetary Resources for Education (1951-
52 to 1993-94), Department of Education,  Ministry of Human
Resources Development, New Delhi.
Government of India, Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure on Education,
Ministry of Human Resource Development, New Delhi, various
years.
Government of India (1997a): Selected Educational Statistics, Ministry
of Human Resources Development, New Delhi.
Government of India (1997b): Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure on
Education, 1993-94 to 1995-96, Ministry of Human Resource
Development, New Delhi.
Government of India (1998a): Analysis of Budgeted Expenditure on
Education, 1994-95 to 1996-97, Ministry of Human Resource
Development, New Delhi.
Government of India (1998b): Education in India, Vol. I (S), Ministry of
Human Resource Development, New Delhi.
Government of India (2000): Economic Survey 1999-2000, Ministry of
Finance, New Delhi.43
Government of India (2003): Selected Socio-economic Statisitcs India
2001, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, New
Delhi.
Gupta,  Sanjeev, and  Marjin  Verhoeven (2001): “The Efficiency of
Government Expenditure: Experiences from South Africa,”
Journal of Policy Modelling, 23 (4), May, 433–67.
Hanushek, Erik (1986): “The Economics of Schooling: Production and
Efficiency in Public Schools,” Journal of Economic Literature,
XXIV, 1141–1177.
Hanushek, Erik (1995): “Interpreting Recent Research on Schooling in
Developing Countries,”  World Bank Research Observer, X (2),
August, 227–246.
Harbison, Ralph, and Eric Hanushek (1994): Educational Performance
of the Poor: Lessons from Rural Northeast Brazil, Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Hicks, N, and A Kubisch (1984): “Cutting Government Expenditures in
LDCs,” Finance and Development, Vol. 21, No. 3.
Inchauste, G (2000): Educational Choices and Educational Constraints:
Evidence from Bolivia, IMF Working Paper, WP/00/42, March
2000.
Institute of Applied Manpower Research (1999): Educational
Deprivation Index, New Delhi, March 1999.
Kingdon, Geeta Gandhi (1998): “Does the Labour Market Explain Lower
Female Schooling in India?”, The Journal of Development Studies,
Vol. 35, No. 144
Kremer, Michael R (1995): “Research on Schooling: What We Know
and What We Don’t A Comment on  Hanushek”,  World Bank
Research Observer, Vol 10, No. 2, 247-54.
Lau, L J, D T Jamison, S C Liu, and S Rivkin (1993): “Education and
Economic Growth: Some Cross-Sectional Evidence from Brazil,”
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 41, 45–70.
Lucas, R E (1988): “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 22, 3–22.
Majumdar, Tapas (1983): Investment in Education and Social Choice,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Marshall, Alfred (1890): Principles of Economics, sixth edition, 1910, p.
217
Mathur, A (1993): “The Human Capital Stock and Regional Economic
Development in India,” in S C Nuna (ed.) Regional Disparities in
Educational Development, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi.
Musgrave (1959): The Theory of Public Finance, McGraw Hill, New
York.
National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) (1998):  Attending an
Educational Institution in India: Its Level, Nature and Cost, NSS
Fifty-second Round, July 1995–June 1996, Department of
Statistics, Government of India, 432 (52/25.2/1).
NCERT (1997): Educational Facilities in Rural and Urban Areas, Sixth
All India Educational Survey, National Tables, Volume I, New
Delhi.45
Pal, S P, and D K Pant (1995): “Strategies to Improve School Enrolment
Rate in India,”  Journal of Educational Planning and
Administration, Vol. IX, No. 2, April, New Delhi.
Patel, S J (1985): “Educational ‘Miracle’ in Third World, 1950 to 1981,”
Economic and Political Weekly, Aug 3, Vol XX, No. 31: 1312–17.
Pradhan, B K, and P K Roy (2003): The Well Being of Indian Households:
MIMAP-India Survey Report, Tata-McGraw Hill, New Delhi.
Pradhan, B K, & A  Subramanian: “Education and the Poor: Evidence
from a Household Survey,” A previous version of the paper was
presented at “A Regional Consultation on WDR 2001 for South
Asia,” April 4–6, 1999, Rajendrapur, Bangladesh, jointly organised
by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies and the World
Bank.
PROBE Team (1999):  Public Report on Basic Education in India,
Oxford University Press, New Delhi
Psacharopoulos, G (1993): “Returns to Investment in Education: A
Global Update,” PPR Working Paper No. WPS 1067, World Bank,
Washington D.C.
Psacharapoulos, G, and M  Woodhall (1985):  Education for
Development: An Analysis of Investment Choices, Oxford for the
World Bank, New York.
Romer, P M (1986): “Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth,”
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, 1002–37.46
Sahn, David E (1987): “Changes in the Living Standards of the Poor in Sri
Lanka during a Period of Macroeconomic Restructuring,” World
Development, Vol. 15, No. 6, pp. 809-830.
Sahn, David E (1992): Public Expenditures in Sub-Saharan Africa during
a Period of Economic Reforms, World Development, Vol. 20, No. 5,
pp. 673-693.
Singh, Ram D, and Maria Santiago (1997): “Farm Earnings, Educational
Attainment and Role of Public Policy: Some Evidence from
Mexico,” World Development, 25 (12), December, 2143–54.
Sipahimalani, Vandana (1999): “Education in the Rural Indian Household:
A Gender Based Perspective,” NCAER Working Paper No. 68,
June.
Taylor, L (1993): “Stabilisation, Adjustment and Reform,” in L Taylor
(ed.), The Rocky Road to Reform, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Tilak, Jandhyala B G (1987):  Economics of Inequality in Education,
Sage Publications/ Institute of Economic Growth, New Delhi.
Tilak, Jandhyala B G (1989): “Education and its Relation to Economic
Growth, Poverty and Income Distribution”, Discussion Paper no.
46, World Bank, Washington D.C.
Tilak, Jandhyala B G (2002): “Determinants of Household Expenditure
on Education in India, Working Paper Series No. 88, National
Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi.
United Nations (1996):  Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the
Pacific 1996, New York.
World Bank (1993): The East Asian Miracle, Oxford University Press,
New York.